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ENTRATA, INC. (F/K/A PROPERTY SOLUTIONS
13 INTERNATIONAL, INC.)

14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
15 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

16 YARDI SYSTEMS, INC.,

17 Plaintiff,

18 v.

19 PROPERTY SOLUTIONS
20 INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

21 Defendant.

22 PROPERTY SOLUTIONS
23 INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

24 Counterclaimant,

25 v.

26 YARDI SYSTEMS, INC.,

27 Counterdefendant.
28

Case No. 2:13-CV-07764-FMO-CW

**ENTRATA, INC.'S (F/K/A
PROPERTY SOLUTIONS
INTERNATIONAL, INC.)
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT**

Date: February 25, 2016
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Ctrm: 22

Judge: Honorable Fernando M. Olguin

**Pretrial Conference: Not set
Trial Date: Not Set**

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 This case is an attempt by the dominant company in the property
3 management software industry, Yardi Systems, Inc. (“Yardi”), to quash competition
4 from a young and growing property management software company, Entrata, Inc.
5 (“Entrata,” formerly known as Property Solutions International, Inc.) by bringing
6 claims that provably lack merit. For many years, Yardi worked cooperatively with
7 Entrata to facilitate integration of Entrata’s portal and add-on software products
8 with Yardi’s widely-used Voyager accounting software. Once Entrata began to
9 take large customers from Yardi in the portal and add-on market, and announced at
10 an industry trade show in 2012 that it had developed its own accounting software—
11 Entrata Core—Yardi reversed course. Yardi claimed that it did not know Entrata
12 had access to the Voyager software and related information and filed this action.
13 Should there be a trial, the evidence will show that the Entrata Core accounting
14 software was independently developed and that Yardi’s claims of infringement are
15 meritless. But, as shown below, most of Yardi’s claims fail as a matter of law on
16 undisputed facts and thus are properly resolved now.

17 Yardi knew by June 2006 that Entrata had obtained access to Yardi’s
18 Voyager software and databases from mutual Yardi-Entrata customers; in fact,
19 Yardi consented to that access. Yardi has unambiguously identified this conduct as
20 the basis for its present claims. But Yardi delayed bringing these claims until
21 October 2013. Thus, Yardi’s claims for misappropriation of trade secrets,
22 intentional interference with contractual relations, and breach of implied-in-fact
23 contract are time-barred, and its copyright claims are subject to limited damages.

24 Even if Yardi’s trade secrets claim was timely, Yardi cannot recover based
25 on a theory that a commercially available software package “in its entirety” is a
26 trade secret.

27 Moreover, Yardi’s claim for intentional interference with contractual
28 relations is preempted because it is based on exactly the same facts underlying its

1 trade secrets claim.

2 Finally, Entrata's access to Voyager went no further than using legitimate
3 login information and license files to obtain user-level access. These undisputed
4 facts establish that Entrata did not "circumvent" digital walls as required to violate
5 the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").

6 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

7 A. Entrata's Early Business Model.

8 Entrata, then called Property Solutions, was founded by three students at
9 Brigham Young University in 2003, with the initial goal of designing a new
10 property management accounting software product. (D1; D2; D3; Bateman Tr.
11 13:13-14:2, 19:9-11; Zimmer Tr. 78:19-20; Ex. 12 at 31.) Property management
12 software allows managers of multiple rental units to perform accounting and
13 management tasks, including organizing and storing resident information,
14 processing applications to rent properties, and processing payments.
15 Entrata's property management software was branded as ResidentWorks in 2004.
16 (D4; Bateman Tr. 11:9-23.) For several years after its founding, however, Entrata's
17 business model focused on the development of add-ons and portal products for
18 other companies' property management software, such as Yardi's Voyager
19 software. (D6; Ex. 12 at 31.) Entrata's initial add-on products were ResidentPay®,
20 ProspectPortal®, and ResidentPortal™. (D8; Hanna Tr. 12:16-24.) These portals
21 enhanced the capabilities of existing property management software packages and
22 enabled features like online rent payment, online rental applications, and online
23 submission of work orders. (D9; D10; D11; Hanna Tr. 27:14-21.) Entrata
24 developed custom integration tools that allow its add-on and portal products to
25 work with several core property management systems. (D12; Hanna Tr. 27:9-28:7.)
26 These tools function by moving data into and out of the third-party property
27 management application and the client's database. (D13; Bateman Tr. 124:14-18.)
28

1 **B. Entrata Obtains Access to Voyager and Voyager Databases,**
2 **With Yardi's Knowledge and Approval.**

3 Yardi develops, markets, and sells database and application software for the
4 property management industry. (D14; Am. Compl., ECF 46, ¶ 14.) Yardi's
5 principal product is a core property management accounting system branded as
6 Yardi Voyager. (D15; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 15.) For years, Yardi encouraged
7 developers, such as Entrata, to create specialized add-on and portal products for its
8 property management software. (D16; Am. Compl. ¶ 17.) Yardi profits from these
9 products, not only because they enhance the usability of Voyager, but also because
10 it charges clients a \$2,500 annual fee to deploy a third-party integration. (D17;
11 Beane Tr. 44:24-46:7; Yardi 12/11/14 Tr. 57:22-58:2.)

12 In 2004, some of Yardi's property management customers, including
13 Western National Group ("WNG"), began to express interest in using Entrata's
14 portal products with their Yardi accounting systems. (D18; Ex. 12 at 31;
15 Shoemaker Tr. 10:16-14:8; Yardi 12/11/14 Tr. 8:5-9:10; Bateman Tr. 63:1-67:7.)
16 Entrata reached out to Yardi to obtain Yardi's database schema¹ and a Voyager test
17 system to facilitate development of this integration. (D19; Ex. 12 at 31-32;
18 Shoemaker Tr. 15:13-16:19; Yardi 12/11/14 Tr. 9:11-10:10; Bateman Tr. 63:1-
19 67:7.) Yardi then provided a license file that allowed Entrata to install and operate
20 Yardi Genesis, the desktop application version of Voyager. (D21; D22; D23; Ex. 1;
21 Millar Tr. 15:19-17:19, 18:6-19:14; Shroff Tr. 82:18-83:1; Shoemaker Tr. 28:23-
22 29:3, 44:22-24; Yardi 12/11/14 Tr. 20:8-12.)

23 In June 2006, Entrata was preparing to launch its custom add-on and portal
24 integration with Voyager for WNG. (D26; Ex. 2 at 4; Bateman Tr. 63:2-65:25,
25 112:8-20.) During the project, Entrata contacted Yardi Vice President Bryant

26 ¹ According to Yardi, a database schema "is a technique for organizing the
27 database, the different elements in the database, including tables and columns. And
28 it captures how they are stored." (D20; Yardi 12/11/14 Tr. at 9:20-24.)

1 Shoemaker to explain that Entrata would need access to both the Voyager
2 application and a database in order to build its integration. (D32; D103; Shoemaker
3 Tr. 6:10-7:7; Yardi 11/12/14 Tr. 16:12-18:21; Bateman 12/8/15 Tr. 259:5-24.)
4 Mr. Shoemaker told Entrata to get the Voyager application and database from
5 WNG. (D104; Bateman 12/8/15 Tr. 259:5-24.)

6 Before launch, Entrata again contacted Mr. Shoemaker to confirm that WNG
7 could provide Entrata with “another copy of its database so we can test on it.”
8 (D27; Ex. 2 at 4; Shoemaker Tr., 37:12-42:20; Yardi 11/12/14 Tr. 16:12-18:21;
9 Bateman Tr. 63:2-65:25; 112:8-20.) Mr. Shoemaker confirmed that WNG could
10 provide Entrata with a current copy of its Voyager database. (D28; Ex. 2 at 4;
11 Yardi 12/11/14 Tr. 18:17-21, Bateman Tr. 64:21-65:25; Shoemaker Tr. 38:12-
12 41:18.) Mr. Shoemaker admitted that he would have discussed this request with
13 Yardi’s legal group prior to responding. (D29; Shoemaker Tr. 41:10-42:20.)

14 Just days after Mr. Shoemaker provided this consent, a WNG employee
15 copied Mr. Shoemaker on an email explaining that WNG was going to provide
16 Entrata with a “new license file” for the Yardi Voyager software. (D33; Ex. 13;
17 Shoemaker Tr. 42:21-44:24; Yardi 12/11/14 Tr. 19:9-21:2; Bateman Tr. 63:1-65:25
18 Bateman 12/8/15 Tr. 259:25-262:20.) Mr. Shoemaker understood that a license file
19 unlocks Yardi’s software. (D35; Shoemaker Tr. 44:22-24.) Yardi raised no
20 objection to WNG providing Entrata with a Voyager license file. WNG then sent
21 its license file for Voyager to Entrata. (D34; Ex. 14; Shoemaker Tr. 47:18-24,
22 48:9-15; Yardi Tr. 24:2-9; Bateman Tr. 64:21-65:25.) Receiving this license file
23 allowed Entrata to install and operate the Voyager application. (D35; Shoemaker
24 Tr. 44:22-24; Yardi 12/11/14 Tr. 20:8-15; Bateman 12/8/15 Tr. 260:13-19 (“The
25 license essentially unlocks the application and allows it to function. . . . So without
26 the license file the Voyager application would have done us no good.”).) As
27 Entrata’s CEO and lead developer David Bateman explained, “there would have
28 been absolutely no purpose to have a license file were it not to turn on the software

1 application. That’s the purpose of it. Any entry-level programmer, or anybody, is
2 familiar with the concept of how a license file is used in software.” (D105;
3 Bateman 12/8/15 Tr. 270:19-271:5.)

4 Subsequent interactions between Yardi and Entrata repeatedly made clear to
5 Yardi that Entrata had access to Voyager software and Voyager databases:

- 6 • In April 2008, David Bateman from Entrata sent Yardi a screenshot of the
7 Voyager user interface, which, according to a Yardi employee, showed Yardi
8 “that he has access to the Yardi Voyager Software.” (D99; D100; Ex. 41 at 381-
9 382; Millar Tr. 37:19-38:1.)
- 10 • In April 2008, Yardi itself provided Entrata with login credentials and access to
11 the Voyager software. (D97; D98; Ex. 41 at 381, 384 (Yardi employee emailing
12 Entrata a link to an “instance of Voyager [with] our Interfaces Plug-in v1
13 Installed on it.”))
- 14 • In August 2008, Jason Alfano, a Yardi systems analyst and member of the
15 application service provider (“ASP”) team (D36; Alfano Tr. 9:16-11:7),
16 instructed a Yardi account manager that Entrata should work directly with
17 mutual clients to set up and maintain the Entrata integration with Voyager.
18 (D37; Ex. 5; Alfano Tr. 22:15-23.)
- 19 • No later than September 2008, Entrata provided Yardi with instructions for
20 installing the Entrata integration utility with Voyager on Yardi’s servers.² (D38;
21 Ex. 6; Ex. 7; Alfano Tr. 24:25-25:11.) These instructions listed specific tables
22 used in the Voyager database, evidencing that Entrata had access to it. (D39;
23 Ex. 7 at 20-21; Alfano Tr. 27:5-28:18.)
- 24 • In November 2008, Yardi provided Entrata personnel with a login for both the

25 _____
26 ² For “hosted” clients, the client database and the Entrata custom integration
27 software resided on Yardi servers. “Self-hosted” clients maintained the database
28 and Entrata custom integration software on their own computers. (See D24; D25;
Millar Tr. 7:18-8:11.)

1 user interface and the database of the Voyager development site. (D41; Ex. 3;
2 Millar Tr. 29:2-33:3.) This development site was a sandbox version of Voyager
3 software. (D42; Yardi 12/11/14 Tr. 58:12-59:1.)

- 4 • Beginning at least in 2008, Yardi representatives participated in GoToMeeting
5 webconferences with Entrata and mutual clients where they could see Entrata
6 representatives logging into the Voyager application. (D101; Shroff 12/8/15 Tr.
7 86:22-90:20.)
- 8 • In January 2009, Mr. Alfano again instructed Yardi client services employees
9 that they should simply provide mutual Yardi-Entrata clients with a URL to the
10 Entrata integration to Voyager, and then Yardi could “close the case” because
11 “this is for them [the mutual client] to work with the third party [Entrata] on.”
12 (D43; D44; Ex. 8; Alfano Tr. 35:22-38:19.)
- 13 • In February 2009, Mr. Yardi personally approved setting up an Entrata custom
14 integration on a test Voyager database for a mutual customer to allow Entrata to
15 test its custom integration. (D45; Ex. 9 at 25; Alfano Tr. 44:17-45:18; Shroff Tr.
16 56:8-57:4, 98:1-12.)
- 17 • In May 2009, a mutual customer contacted Yardi and noted that “[w]e’ve signed
18 a Property Solutions-Yardi addendum to start the integration with them awhile
19 [sic] ago. They mentioned that they already have access to our database.”
20 (D46; Ex. 21 at 56; Yardi 12/11/14 Tr. 240:1-241:6.)
- 21 • In October 2009, a mutual customer contacted Yardi about “the issue with our
22 integration with [Entrata] that I called you about.” The customer told Yardi that
23 “I set them up already in Yardi Voyager and their user id is psiintegration.”
24 (D47; Ex. 21 at 57; Yardi 12/11/14 Tr. 241:22-242:7.)
- 25 • In November 2009, a mutual client reported to Yardi that Entrata needed the
26 database owner login and password for a Voyager test database. Mr. Alfano
27 confirmed that the responsibility for updating the credentials for the Voyager
28 test database was up to Entrata and the client. (D48; D49; Ex. 10; Alfano Tr.

1 69:7-72:3.)

- 2 • In September 2010, Yardi directed an Entrata employee to obtain a Voyager
3 database password from a mutual client. (D50; Ex. 11; Alfano Tr. 77:11-80:7.)

4 **C. Yardi’s CEO Has Entrata’s Custom Integration Decompiled**
5 **and Explains that Entrata Had Access to Yardi’s Systems.**

6 By 2008, Yardi had lost multiple large clients for its own portal and add-on
7 products to Entrata. (D51; Ex. 15; Ex. 16; Yardi 12/11/14 Tr. 69:10-72:13.) As
8 Mr. Yardi explained, Yardi was “losing” to Entrata. (D52; Yardi 12/11/14 Tr.
9 69:22-70:6.) In November 2009, Mr. Yardi ordered his software developers to
10 decompile the Entrata custom integration that Yardi had installed on its servers.
11 Decompilation allowed Yardi to decipher Entrata’s object code into source code
12 (that is, the human readable code that forms the basis of the software). (D53A;
13 D53B; Ex. 17; Ex. 18; Yardi 12/11/14 Tr. 124:10-125:13, 126:13-127:10.) Mr.
14 Yardi admits that decompiling Entrata violated the parties’ non-disclosure
15 agreement. (D54; Yardi 12/11/14 Tr. 51:22-52:4.)

16 In December 2009, one month after reviewing Entrata’s source code, and
17 nearly four years before filing this lawsuit, Mr. Yardi told Gordon Morrell (a
18 “senior member” of Yardi) and Terri Downen (Yardi’s head of sales):

19 We need a statement from our consultants that they will not help our
20 competitors.

21 I puzzle over how Property Solutions was able to figure out so much
22 about our data structure and programming nuances.

23 They had access to somebody who know [sic] our system
24 *They had access to our system for debugging*

25 Don’t see how else they could have written the program.

26 (D55; D56; D57; Ex. 20 (emphasis added); Yardi 12/11/14 Tr. 34:19-22, 134:16-
27 134:25, 197:24-198:1.) Mr. Yardi admitted that, as of December 2009, he had a
28 “*suspicion*” that Entrata had access to a copy of the Voyager application. (D58;

1 Yardi 12/11/14 Tr. 136:6-18.)

2 Jay Shobe, one of Yardi's key software developers, also reviewed the
3 decompiled code for Entrata's custom integration. (D59; D60; Ex. 19; Yardi
4 12/11/14 Tr. 128:9-129:3, 133:1-4.) Mr. Shobe reported the results of his review to
5 Mr. Yardi, Mr. Morrell, and John Pendergast (a Yardi Senior Vice President) on
6 December 3, 2009. (D61; D62; D63; Ex. 19; Yardi 12/11/14 Tr. 132:8-134:13.)
7 Mr. Shobe told these senior members of Yardi that he believed Entrata was running
8 "our program," i.e., Voyager, and that Entrata was "reverse engineering" Yardi
9 code. (*Id.*) Mr. Shobe recommended telling Entrata that Yardi was studying the
10 Entrata source code to "give them something to think about." (*Id.*)

11 **D. Entrata Independently Develops the Entrata Core Program.**

12 Separately from its custom integration and portal products that worked in
13 conjunction with Yardi's software programs, Entrata resumed development of its
14 own property management software system in earnest in late 2011 and 2012, which
15 was rebranded from ResidentWorks to Entrata ("Entrata Core"). (D102; Bateman
16 12/8/15 Tr. 243:1-244:21.) Entrata Core was developed independently of Entrata's
17 work with custom integrations and portal products for Yardi's software. Yardi
18 continues to dispute this, but the dispute is irrelevant to the present statute of
19 limitations motion.

20 **III. ARGUMENT**

21 **A. Yardi's Trade Secret Claim Is Time-Barred.**

22 **1. Yardi's Trade Secret Claim Is Subject to a**
23 **Three-Year Statute of Limitations.**

24 An action for misappropriation under the California Uniform Trade Secrets
25 Act ("CUTSA") must be brought within three years after the misappropriation is
26 discovered or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered.
27
28

1 Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.6.³ The limitations period begins “when [plaintiff] has
2 reason at least to suspect a factual basis for its elements.” *Cypress Semiconductor*
3 *Corp. v. Superior Court*, 163 Cal. App. 4th 575, 586 (2008) (quoting *Fox v. Ethicon*
4 *Endo-Surgery, Inc.*, 35 Cal. 4th 797, 807 (2005)). The statute of limitations begins
5 to run regardless of whether “plaintiff can unassailably establish a legal claim for
6 trade secret misappropriation” because to do otherwise “would effectively
7 eviscerate the statute of limitations in all cases in which the plaintiff never
8 discovers ‘smoking gun’ evidence of misappropriation.” *Id.* (quoting *Chasteen v.*
9 *UNISIA JECS Corp.*, 216 F.3d 1212, 1218 (10th Cir. 2000)).

10 As the California Supreme Court has explained:

11 A plaintiff need not be aware of the specific “facts” necessary to
12 establish the claim; that is a process contemplated by pretrial
13 discovery. Once the plaintiff has a *suspicion* of wrongdoing, and
14 therefore an incentive to sue, she must decide whether to file suit or sit
15 on her rights. *So long as a suspicion exists, it is clear that the plaintiff*
must go find the facts; she cannot wait for the facts to find her.

16 *Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co.*, 44 Cal. 3d 1103, 1111 (1988) (emphasis added). For
17 example, California courts have found that trade secret limitations periods were
18 triggered when a plaintiff “suspected” defendant’s product was a “rip-off,” *Gabriel*
19 *Techs. Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.*, 857 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1004 (S.D. Cal. 2012), and
20 when a plaintiff stated that a defendant’s trade show demonstration “looks like” it
21 was using plaintiff’s technique, *Alamar Biosciences, Inc. v. Difco Labs., Inc.*, 40
22 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1437 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 1995).

23 In interpreting the statute of limitations for the CUTSA, the California
24 Supreme Court has also held that “a plaintiff’s claim for misappropriation of a trade

25 ³ Defendant need only point to the date of the alleged misappropriation.
26 Plaintiff then bears the burden of proving that it “did not discover, nor with
27 reasonable diligence should have discovered, facts that would have caused a
28 reasonable person to suspect” within the statutory period. CACI 4421.

1 secret against a defendant arises only once, when the trade secret is initially
2 misappropriated, and each subsequent use or disclosure of the secret augments the
3 initial claim rather than arises as a separate claim.” *Cadence Design Sys., Inc. v.*
4 *Avant! Corp.*, 29 Cal. 4th 215, 227 (2002). “The first discovered (or discoverable)
5 misappropriation of a trade secret ... commences the limitation period.” *Glue-Fold,*
6 *Inc. v. Slautterback Corp.*, 82 Cal. App. 4th 1018, 1026 (2000).

7 A continuing misappropriation constitutes a single claim. Cal. Civ. Code
8 § 3426.6. Likewise, misappropriation claims accrue at the same time for all related
9 trade secrets that were shared with defendant during the same time period, “even if
10 there have not yet been any acts of misappropriation of the other trade secrets.”
11 *Forcier v. Microsoft Corp.*, 123 F. Supp. 2d 520, 525 (N.D. Cal. 2000).

12 **2. Yardi Was on Notice of Its Trade Secrets Claim More**
13 **Than Three Years Before Bringing This Lawsuit.**

14 Yardi’s trade secrets case is based on the allegation that Entrata acquired
15 Yardi’s alleged trade secrets with knowledge or reason to know that they were
16 acquired by improper means through, among other things: copying the Voyager
17 software without authorization; inducing mutual clients of Yardi and Entrata to
18 disclose trade secret information; and accessing the Voyager software through
19 access that Yardi granted its clients pursuant to license agreements and/or
20 confidentiality agreements. (D65; D66; D67; Am. Compl. ¶ 56.) Yardi claims that
21 the confidential and/or trade secret information accessed by Entrata included
22 Voyager and Genesis.⁴ (D68; Ex. 26.) Yardi subsequently disclosed various
23 functionalities in Voyager as trade secrets and claimed that the “Voyager software
24 program in its entirety” is a trade secret. (D69; Ex. 25 at ¶ 23.)

25 The evidence, however, establishes that Yardi knew Entrata had acquired

26 ⁴ As discussed in the factual background, the undisputed evidence in this case
27 shows that Yardi itself provided Entrata with a copy of Genesis. Yardi no longer
28 appears to be pursuing any Genesis-based trade secrets claim.

1 access to the Voyager program and database from mutual clients as early as 2006.
2 For example, Yardi knew that mutual customer WNG was providing Entrata a “new
3 license file” for Voyager as well as access to a Voyager database. (D28; D33; D34;
4 Ex. 2 at 4; Ex. 13; Ex. 14; Shoemaker Tr. 38:12-41:18, 42:21-44:24, 47:18-24,
5 48:9-15; Yardi 12/11/14 Tr. 18:17-21,19:9-21:2, 24:2-9; Bateman Tr. 63:1-65:25;
6 Bateman 12/8/15 Tr. 259:25-262:20.) The function of this license file was to
7 unlock the Yardi Voyager application so a user could install and operate it. (D35;
8 Shoemaker Tr. 44:22-24, 47:18-48:15; Yardi 12/11/14 Tr. 20:8-15; Bateman
9 12/8/15 Tr. 260:13-19.) There would have been “absolutely no purpose” to have
10 the license file without having a copy of the Voyager application to unlock. (D105;
11 Bateman 12/8/15 Tr. 270:19-271:5.) Even Yardi’s own installation instructions
12 accompanying the license file make clear that the license file is used “[i]n order to
13 provide access to the new Yardi software” and that installing the license file
14 requires, *inter alia*, “install[ing] the new program or upgrade” and “load[ing] the
15 license file into your program.” (D94; D95; Bateman 12/8/15 Tr. 263:7-267:2.)

16 Thus, as of June 2006, Yardi knew of the basis for its trade secrets claim—
17 namely, that Entrata had access to a copy of Voyager and the license file necessary
18 to use it, was obtaining access to Voyager and Voyager databases from mutual
19 customers, and was using the access provided by Yardi to those mutual customers,
20 i.e., the customer license file. The statute of limitations began to run in June 2006
21 and expired in June 2009, years before Yardi filed its complaint. Cal. Civ. Code
22 § 3426.6. Any subsequent conduct merely augmented this initial claim. *Cadence*,
23 29 Cal. 4th at 227. Likewise, this limitations period applies to all of Yardi’s alleged
24 trade secrets, because these alleged trade secrets were shared with Entrata at the
25 same time, in connection with the same relationship, and all concerned Yardi’s
26 Voyager software. *Forcier*, 123 F. Supp. 2d, 526.

27 Moreover, Yardi also had knowledge of its trade secret claim at least by late
28 2009. After reviewing Entrata’s source code—which Yardi admits was a violation

1 of the parties’ non-disclosure agreement—Yardi’s key software developer sent an
2 email to Yardi’s senior executives explaining his belief that Entrata was running a
3 copy of Voyager and was “reverse engineering” Yardi code.⁵ (D60; D62; D53A;
4 D53B; D54; Ex. 17; Ex. 18; Ex. 19; Yardi 12/11/14 Tr. 51:22-52:4, 124:10-125:13,
5 126:13-127:1; 132:8-134:13.) In December 2009, after reviewing Entrata’s custom
6 integration source code, Mr. Yardi likewise expressed his belief that Entrata had
7 access to Voyager. (D57; Ex. 20; Yardi 12/11/14 Tr. 134:16-134:25.)

8 Tellingly, Mr. Yardi confirmed at his deposition that he had a “suspicion” in
9 2009 that Entrata had access to a copy of Voyager—which begins the statute of
10 limitations as a matter of law. (D58; Yardi 12/11/14 Tr. 136:6-18); *Cypress*, 163
11 Cal. App. 4th, 586. As with the evidence regarding June 2006, these facts are more
12 than sufficient to trigger a limitations period that expired before Yardi’s October
13 2013 complaint. *See Gabriel Techs.*, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 1004.

14 **3. Equitable Estoppel and Fraudulent Concealment Do**
15 **Not Apply Here.**

16 Yardi previously argued that because Entrata denied having current access to
17 Voyager when confronted by Yardi with potential legal action in 2012, Entrata is
18 estopped from asserting the statute of limitations. But Yardi has not pleaded the
19 parallel doctrines of fraudulent concealment or equitable estoppel as required by the
20 Ninth Circuit, *Hexcel Corp. v. Ineos Polymers, Inc.*, 681 F.3d 1055, 1060 (9th Cir.
21 2012), and Entrata’s statements in 2012 are irrelevant under the law.

22 Even if they had been properly pleaded, equitable estoppel and fraudulent
23 concealment are inapplicable here because Yardi already was on notice of the basis
24 of its trade secret claim in 2012: it knew Entrata had access to Voyager software
25 and databases and had known of that access for years. Equitable estoppel requires,
26 *inter alia*, that “the party asserting the estoppel must be ignorant of the true state of

27 ⁵ Entrata has never viewed Yardi’s source code. (D106; Ex. 29.)
28

1 facts” and that it “must rely upon [defendant’s] conduct to his injury.” *Ashou v.*
2 *Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co.*, 138 Cal. App. 4th 748, 767 (2006). Moreover, a
3 defendant’s alleged concealment does not toll a statute of limitations, “whatever the
4 lengths to which a defendant has gone to conceal the wrongs, if a plaintiff is on
5 notice of a potential claim.” *Rita M. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop*, 187 Cal. App.
6 3d 1453, 1460 (1986); *see also Fahmy v. Jay-Z*, 835 F. Supp. 2d 783, 791 (C.D.
7 Cal. 2011) (no tolling where plaintiff had actual or constructive knowledge).

8 *Bergstein v. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP* is instructive. 236 Cal. App.
9 4th 793 (2015). In that case, plaintiffs accused defendants of accessing their
10 confidential information, which defendants repeatedly denied. The Court of Appeal
11 found that these denials did not constitute fraudulent concealment because “denials
12 of wrongdoing are not the same as fraudulent concealment.” Indeed, the court
13 explained, “‘it would be somewhat surprising’ if defendants ‘were to issue a mea
14 culpa and beg forgiveness’ when they received counsel’s demand letters.” *Id.* at
15 818. Defendants’ representations did not concern the “*necessity* of bringing a
16 timely suit” and therefore did not induce a delay. *Id.* at 820. (citing *Lantzy v. Centex*
17 *Homes*, 31 Cal. 4th 363, 385 (2003).) Nor could plaintiffs claim fraudulent
18 concealment because they continued to suspect defendants’ allegedly wrongful
19 conduct despite their denials. *Id.*

20 So too here, Yardi has admitted that “[n]otwithstanding Property Solutions’
21 carefully worded denials [in 2012], Yardi continued to suspect that Property
22 Solutions was accessing its confidential and proprietary information and
23 copyrighted software.” (D85; Am. Compl. ¶ 34.) Yardi further admits that Entrata
24 never denied having access to Voyager in the past. (D84; Am. Compl. ¶ 33.) It
25 also is not possible for Yardi to have detrimentally relied on Entrata’s comments in
26 2012 because the statute of limitations began to run in June 2006 and expired in
27 June 2009. *See United States v. Shaltry*, 232 F.3d 1046, 1053 (9th Cir. 2000) (no
28 reliance when statement made after deadline had passed).

1 software to develop the Voyager custom interface was authorized by NDA or
2 implied-in-fact agreement; identifying Entrata’s use of Voyager for custom
3 integration as an act underlying Yardi’s claims.) Yardi also renewed its assertion
4 that Entrata’s possession and use of the databases in which client data is stored and
5 organized for use with the Voyager software was wrongful conduct that forms the
6 basis of its claims. (D90-D92, Ex. 45 No. 19 (e.g., “PSI further misappropriated
7 trade secrets by unlawfully securing, possessing, and utilizing Yardi’s Voyager
8 *database...*”)), notwithstanding Yardi’s previous contention that these databases are
9 not trade secrets.⁶ Yardi’s ever-shifting positions evidence the dubious nature of its
10 claims. But for purposes of this motion, its current, binding position—that
11 Entrata’s possession and use of Voyager software and databases for any purpose,
12 dating back to 2006, is the basis for its trade secret and related claims—removes
13 any doubt that those claims are barred.

14 **B. Yardi’s Intentional Interference Claim Is Time-Barred.**

15 **1. Yardi’s Intentional Interference Claim Is Subject to a**
16 **Two-Year Statute of Limitations.**

17 A cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations is
18 governed by a two-year limitations period. *Richardson v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 117
19 Cal. App. 3d 8, 12 (1981); Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 339.1. Generally, the cause of
20 action begins to run on the date of the wrongful act, but no later than the date the
21 breach actually occurred. *Forcier*, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 530 (citing *Trembath v.*
22 *Digardi*, 43 Cal. App. 3d 834 (1974)). California courts also recognize the
23 “discovery rule” if the plaintiff proves “facts showing that he was not negligent in
24

25 ⁶ The undisputed evidence establishes that Yardi permitted Entrata to get
26 these databases from mutual clients, including an admission by Yardi’s CEO that
27 Yardi’s clients were free to send their databases to whomever they wanted (D30;
28 Yardi 12/11/14 Tr. 188:2-5.), which caused Yardi to admit that Yardi’s databases
were *not* trade secrets. (D31; *compare* Ex. 24 ¶ 18 *with* Ex. 25 ¶ 18.)

1 failing to make the discovery sooner and that he had no actual or presumptive
2 knowledge of facts sufficient to put him on inquiry.” If the discovery rule applies,
3 the statute of limitations begins to run on the date that the plaintiff “suspects or has
4 reason to suspect a factual basis for the elements of the claim.” *Forcier*, 123 F.
5 Supp. 2d at 531 (quoting *Norgart v. Upjohn Co.*, 21 Cal. 4th 383, 397-98 (1999)).

6 **2. Yardi Was on Notice of Its Intentional Interference**
7 **Claim More Than Two Years Before Bringing This**
8 **Lawsuit.**

9 Here, the outcome is the same regardless of whether the statute of limitations
10 runs from the allegedly wrongful act or whether the discovery rule applies: Yardi
11 brought its claim too late. Yardi contends that “[e]very time that Property Solutions
12 requested and obtained access to the Voyager software or confidential Yardi
13 information from Yardi clients, Property Solutions interfered with and caused a
14 breach of that client’s contract with Yardi.” (D74; Ex. 28.) Yardi also now alleges
15 that Entrata interfered with Yardi’s business relationships when it requested
16 Voyager *databases* from mutual clients. (D90-D92, Ex. 45 No. 19.) As discussed
17 above, there can be no genuine dispute that Yardi knew of this conduct as early as
18 June 2006, when Yardi knew that Entrata was requesting and obtaining access to
19 the Voyager software and databases from Yardi clients. (D28; D33; D34; Ex. 2 at
20 4; Ex. 13; Ex. 14; Yardi 12/11/14 Tr. 18:17-21, 19:9-21:2, 24:2-9; Bateman Tr.
21 63:1-65:25; Shoemaker Tr. 38:12-41:18, 42:21-44:24, 47:18-24, 48:9-15; Bateman
22 12/8/15 Tr. 259:25-262:20.) Yardi repeatedly was reminded over the following
23 years that mutual clients were providing Entrata with access to Voyager and
24 Voyager databases. (*See, e.g.*, D47; Ex. 21 at 57; Yardi 12/11/14 Tr. 241:22-242:7
25 (mutual client informing Yardi in 2009 that client had set up Entrata with Voyager
26 and a Voyager user ID).) Thus, Yardi knew of the conduct underlying its claim for
27 intentional interference with contractual relations more than seven years before
28 filing suit. Yardi’s claim for intentional interference is time-barred.

1 **C. Yardi’s Breach of Implied Contract Claim Is Time-Barred.**

2 **1. Yardi’s Claim for Breach of Implied Contract Is**
3 **Subject to a Two-Year Statute of Limitations.**

4 Claims for breach of an implied contract are subject to a two-year statute of
5 limitations. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 339(1); *Kourtis v. Cameron*, 419 F.3d 989,
6 1000 (9th Cir. 2005), *abrogated on other grounds*, *Taylor v. Sturgell*, 553 U.S. 880
7 (2008). Ordinarily, implied contract claims accrue at the time of breach, regardless
8 of whether any damage is apparent or ascertainable. *Id.* (citing *Menefee v.*
9 *Ostawari*, 228 Cal. App. 3d 239 (1991)). Some California courts have recognized
10 that the “discovery rule,” discussed above, can apply to implied contracts.
11 *Seelenfreund v. Terminix of Northern Cal., Inc.*, 84 Cal. App. 3d 133, 136 (1978).
12 Implied contract claims accrue only once; they are not subject to a “continuing
13 violation” theory that can preserve a claim based on repeated breaches. *Kourtis*,
14 419 F.3d at 1000-1001.

15 **2. Yardi Was on Notice of Its Implied Contract Claim**
16 **More Than Two Years Before Bringing This Lawsuit.**

17 Yardi’s implied contract claim is again time-barred, regardless of whether the
18 claim accrued upon the alleged wrongful act or upon discovery, because Yardi
19 admits that it had a reason to suspect the basis for its claim more than two years
20 before filing its complaint. Yardi’s breach of implied contract claim is premised on
21 the allegation that “Property Solutions breached the parties’ implied contract by
22 using information that Yardi provided it in confidence for the sole purpose of
23 resolving specified technical issues to develop Entrata [Core],” the property
24 management system. (D76; Am. Compl. ¶ 77.) Yet Yardi admits that it began to
25 suspect that Entrata “might be misappropriating its trade secrets beginning in mid-
26 2011 when it first heard that [Entrata] might be developing a property management
27 system.” (D77; Ex. 26.) Because Yardi suspected that Entrata was using Yardi
28 confidential information to develop its Entrata accounting software as of mid-2011,

1 the limitations period for its implied contract claim expired in mid-2013. Yet Yardi
2 did not file its complaint until October 21, 2013. As with the causes of action
3 discussed above, Yardi’s delay bars its claim—once Yardi had a suspicion of
4 wrongful conduct, it could not wait for the “facts to find [it]” but “must go find the
5 facts.” *Jolly*, 44 Cal. 3d at 1111.⁷

6 **D. Yardi Cannot Recover Damages for Alleged Copyright or**
7 **DMCA Violations Outside of the Limitations Period.**

8 **1. When a Plaintiff Is on Notice of Infringement More**
9 **Than Three Years Before Filing its Complaint,**
10 **Supreme Court Law Limits the Damages Recoverable.**

11 The Copyright Act provides that “[n]o civil action shall be maintained under
12 the provisions of this title unless it is commenced within three years after the claim
13 accrued.” 17 U.S.C. § 507(b). The limitations period begins to run when a plaintiff
14 learns or by reasonable diligence could have learned that it has a cause of action.
15 *Polar Bear Prods. v. Timex Corp.*, 384 F.3d 700, 706 (9th Cir. 2004) (reprinted at
16 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 22131). In the case of a series of infringing acts, each act
17 will trigger a new three-year limitations period. *Petrella v. MGM*, 134 S. Ct. 1962,
18 1969-70 (2014). However, the Supreme Court has made clear that when a
19 copyright holder is on notice of the infringing acts more than three years prior to the
20 complaint, any damages will be limited to acts occurring during that three year
21 period. *See id.* at 1970. This is because a copyright holder’s suit is considered
22 timely with respect to acts up to three years before the complaint, “but untimely
23 with respect to prior acts of the same or similar kind.” *Petrella*, 134 S. Ct. at 1970.
24 As a result, “the infringer is insulated from liability” for infringements of the same
25 work outside of the three-year period. *Id.* at 1969. The Ninth Circuit also has
26 recognized that “[a] plaintiff’s right to damages is limited to those suffered during

27 ⁷ As discussed above, equitable tolling and equitable concealment based on
28 conduct by Entrata in 2012 cannot apply.

1 the statutory period for bringing claims” *Polar Bear Prods.*, 384 F.3d at 706.

2 The DMCA shares the same three-year statutory limitations period as a
3 traditional copyright claim. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (setting limitations for “provisions
4 of this title”); *Point 4 Data Corp. v. Tri-State Surgical Supply & Equip., Ltd.*, 2013
5 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109298, *118 n.56 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2013) (noting that three-
6 year statute of limitations under § 507(b) applies to DMCA). Accordingly, as with
7 traditional copyright, when the defendant has engaged in a series of discrete acts,
8 the copyright holder’s suit is timely with respect to acts within the three-year
9 window but untimely with respect to prior acts of the same kind. *Id.* at 1970.

10 **2. Yardi Was on Notice of Its Copyright and DMCA**
11 **Claims More Than Three Years Before Bringing This**
12 **Lawsuit.**

13 It cannot genuinely be disputed that Yardi knew of the factual basis for its
14 copyright claim before October 21, 2010—three years before this suit was filed.
15 Yardi’s copyright claim is based on the allegation that Entrata “knowingly and
16 intentionally [copied] and [used] the Voyager software without Yardi’s
17 authorization and without a license to do so.” (D78; Am. Compl. ¶ 45.) Yardi’s
18 damages expert opines that copyright damages began to accrue when Entrata
19 allegedly “first possessed, copied, accessed or used Voyager software” and
20 calculates damages beginning on July 21, 2006, “the first date that [Entrata]
21 admitted that it could verify its employees or agents had access to the Voyager
22 software.” (D80; D81; Ex. 30 at 223, 225.)

23 Yet, as of 2006, Yardi already knew that Entrata had obtained the license file
24 that would allow it to install and operate Voyager. (D33; D35; Ex. 13; Shoemaker
25 Tr. 42:21-44:24, 44:22-24; Yardi 12/11/14 Tr. 19:9-21:2, 20:8-15; Bateman Tr.
26 63:1-65:25; Bateman 12/8/15 Tr. 260:13-19.) Even more tellingly, as of 2009,
27 Yardi’s CEO had a “suspicion” that Entrata had a copy of the Voyager application
28 and Yardi’s key software developer flatly asserted to Yardi executives that Entrata
was running a copy of Voyager on its own server. Because Yardi was on notice

1 that Entrata was using a copy of Voyager prior to October 21, 2010, it may not
2 recover damages for conduct before that date. *Polar Bear Prods.*, 384 F.3d at 706.

3 Yardi also knew or with reasonable diligence could have learned that prior to
4 October 21, 2010, Entrata had obtained customer license files and login credentials
5 that would allow it access to Voyager and the Voyager database. (D28; D33; D35;
6 Ex. 2 at 4; Ex. 13; Yardi 12/11/14 Tr. 18:17-21, 19:9-21:2, 20:8-15; Bateman Tr.
7 63:1-65:25; Shoemaker Tr. 38:12-41:18, 42:21-44:24; Bateman 12/8/15 Tr. 260:13-
8 19.) In fact, Yardi’s employees were actually instructing mutual clients to give
9 Entrata this information. (D37; D44; D49; D50; Ex. 5; Ex. 8; Ex. 10; Ex. 11;
10 Alfano Tr. 22:15-23, 35:22-38:19, 69:7-72:3, 77:11-80:7.) This conduct forms the
11 basis of Yardi’s DMCA claim. (D82; Am. Compl. ¶ 83.) Accordingly, Yardi knew
12 of Entrata’s conduct prior to the limitations period and should not recover any
13 damages relating to this period. *See Polar Bear Prods*, 384 F.3d at 706.

14 **E. Yardi’s Intentional Interference Claim Is Preempted by the**
15 **California Uniform Trade Secrets Act.**

16 **1. The California Uniform Trade Secrets Act Preempts**
17 **Civil Remedies Based on the Same Nucleus of Facts.**

18 It is well established that Section 3426.7 of the CUTSA “implicitly preempts
19 alternative civil remedies based on trade secret misappropriation.” *K.C.*
20 *Multimedia, Inc. v. Bank of Am. Tech. & Ops, Inc.*, 171 Cal. App. 4th 939, 954
21 (2009) (quoting Trade Secrets Practice in Cal. (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed. 2008) Litigation
22 Issues, § 11.35). The CUTSA therefore “provides the exclusive civil remedy for
23 conduct falling within its terms.” *Silvaco Data Sys. v. Intel Corp.*, 184 Cal. App.
24 4th 210, 236 (2010). CUTSA preemption exists wherever a common law claim
25 stems from the same nucleus of fact as the trade secrets claim. *K.C. Multimedia,*
26 *Inc.*, 171 Cal. App. 4th at 962. Even claims involving disclosure of confidential
27 information that does not meet the statutory definition of a trade secret are subject
28 to preemption if they are related to the same core facts. *See Mattel, Inc. v. MGA*
Entm’t, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 2d 911, 987 (C.D. Cal. 2010); *Silvaco*, 184 Cal. App. 4th

1 at 239 n.22.

2 **2. Yardi’s Intentional Interference With Contractual**
3 **Relations Claims Is Based on the Same Facts as Its**
4 **Trade Secret Claim.**

5 Yardi bases its intentional interference with contractual relations claim on
6 precisely the same nucleus of facts as its trade secrets claim, specifically, that
7 Entrata obtained access to Voyager or confidential Yardi information from mutual
8 clients who were subject to a confidentiality obligation to Yardi. (D74; Ex. 28); *see*
9 *K.C. Multimedia, Inc.*, 171 Cal. App. 4th at 958. Yardi alleges Entrata
10 misappropriated its trade secrets by, *inter alia*, inducing clients to provide those
11 trade secrets in breach of their license agreements with Yardi. (D66; D67; Am.
12 Compl. ¶ 56; *see also* D90; Ex. 45 No. 19 (interrogatory response stating same).)
13 Similarly, Yardi’s intentional interference claim alleges that Entrata induced clients
14 to provide it with the Voyager software—which Yardi claims is a trade secret in its
15 entirety—and other information Yardi claims as its trade secrets, resulting in
16 breaches of the clients’ license agreements. (D69; Ex. 25 at ¶ 23.) There is nothing
17 new and different in this claim. Yardi’s intentional interference claim thus is
18 preempted and superseded by the CUTSA. *K.C. Multimedia, Inc.*, 171 Cal. App.
19 4th at 958; *Silvaco*, 184 Cal. App. 4th 210, 236.

20 **F. Yardi Cannot Prove Violation of the DMCA.**

21 **1. Yardi’s DMCA Claim Requires Proof of**
22 **“Circumvention.”**

23 The DMCA provides that “[n]o person shall circumvent a technological
24 measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.” 17
25 U.S.C. § 1201(a). “Circumvent” has a narrow and carefully tailored definition: “to
26 descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid,
27 bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without the
28 authority of the copyright owner.” *MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc.*, 629
F.3d 928, 945 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A)).

1 The substantial weight of authority holds that using a normal password or
2 security code to access a copyrighted work, even without authorization, does not
3 constitute “circumvention.” *Ground Zero Museum Workshop v. Wilson*, 813 F.
4 Supp. 2d 678, 692 (D. Md. 2011) (use of password to access websites not
5 circumvention); *Burroughs Payment Sys. Inc. v. Symco Group, Inc.*, No. 1:10-cv-
6 03029 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 13, 2011) (Ex. 46.) (providing extensive analysis of case law
7 and concluding unauthorized use of password is not “circumvention”); *Real View,*
8 *LLC v. 20-20 Techs., Inc.*, 789 F. Supp. 2d 268, 274-275 (D. Mass. 2011) (noting
9 that courts have held unauthorized use of valid login credentials is not
10 circumvention under the DMCA); *R.C. Olmstead, Inc. v. CU Interface, LLC*, 657 F.
11 Supp. 2d 878, 889 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (using the “approved methodology” to access
12 software is not circumvention, even if it involved use of another’s credentials);
13 *Egilman v. Keller & Heckman, LLP*, 401 F. Supp. 2d 105, 113 (D.D.C. 2005)
14 (unauthorized use of valid credentials is not circumvention); *I.M.S. Inquiry Mgmt.*
15 *Sys. v. Berkshire Info. Sys.*, 307 F. Supp. 2d 521, 532-533 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (using a
16 password is not circumvention). Put differently, “the DMCA targets the
17 *circumvention* of digital walls guarding copyrighted material.” *Universal City*
18 *Studios v. Corley*, 273 F.3d 429, 443 (2d Cir. 2001). Unauthorized access alone
19 does not circumvent these walls. *I.M.S.*, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 532.

20 A minority of cases, from a single judicial district, have held that
21 unauthorized use of login information or software keys can constitute
22 circumvention under the § 1201(a)(2) and (b)(1) anti-trafficking provisions of the
23 DMCA. *See Actuate Corp. v. IBM*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33095 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
24 5, 2010) (Spero, M.J.); *Microsoft Corp. v. EEE Bus., Inc.*, 555 F. Supp. 2d 1051,
25 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2008); *321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc.*, 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085,
26 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Each of the minority rule cases focused on the
27 unauthorized nature of the access, but the pertinent question for the DMCA is
28 whether the narrow standard for “circumvention” is met. *I.M.S.*, 307 F. Supp. 2d at

1 532. The rationale of these cases therefore “contravenes the plain language of the
2 statute, which is focused on the method of entry.” *DISH Network L.L.C. v. World*
3 *Cable Inc.*, 893 F. Supp. 2d 452, 466 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); *see also Navistar, Inc. v.*
4 *New Balt. Garage, Inc.*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134369, *10-14 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20,
5 2012) (rejecting argument that unauthorized use of a password is “circumvention”).

6 Instead, circumvention requires that defendant “*affirmatively performs an*
7 *action* that disables or voids the measure that was installed to prevent them from
8 accessing the copyrighted material.” *DISH*, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 466. Mere “use” of
9 a technological measure without the authority of the copyright owner appears
10 nowhere in the DMCA definition of circumvention. *Egilman*, 401 F. Supp. 2d at
11 113. Thus, the substantial weight of authority holds that “circumvention” requires
12 more than unauthorized use of a valid technological measure.

13 2. Entrata Did Not Engage in “Circumvention.”

14 Here, Yardi has alleged that Entrata “obtained log-in credentials and/or
15 license files issued to Yardi clients, and used such log-in credentials and/or license
16 files to access the Voyager software without authorization.” (D83; Am. Compl. ¶
17 83.) The undisputed evidence establishes that the *only* ways that Entrata accessed
18 Yardi software or databases were through login/password combinations, or through
19 license files that were provided either by mutual Yardi-Entrata clients or by Yardi
20 itself. (D83; Ex. 14; Ex. 27; Shroff Tr. 98:21-100:3; Hanna Tr. 130:11-14, 141:23-
21 142:6; Shoemaker Tr. 47:18-24, 48:9-15; Yardi Tr. 24:2-9; Bateman Tr. 64:21-
22 65:25.) And, as discussed above, Entrata obtained a license file to Voyager from a
23 mutual customer with the full knowledge of Yardi. (D33; Ex. 13; Shoemaker Tr.
24 42:21-44:24; Yardi 12/11/14 Tr. 19:9-21:2; Bateman Tr. 63:1-65:25.)

25 There is no allegation, much less any evidence, that Entrata accessed Yardi
26 software other than through user login credentials, or license files originally
27 generated by Yardi. Nor is there evidence that Entrata disabled or voided access
28 controls or that Entrata intruded upon “digital walls” created to protect Voyager.

1 See *Universal City Studios*, 273 F.3d at 435; *DISH Network L.L.C.*, 893 F. Supp. 2d
2 at 466. Rather, Entrata simply used the methods that Yardi had built into its
3 software to access Voyager and Voyager databases in exactly the same fashion as a
4 Yardi property management customer. *I.M.S.*, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 532 (no
5 circumvention where defendant accessed software like customer). Because Entrata
6 never “descramble[d] a scrambled work, [] decrypt[ed] an encrypted work, or
7 otherwise [] avoid[ed], bypass[ed], remove[d], deactivate[d], or impair[ed] a
8 technological measure,” Yardi’s claim under the DMCA fails.

9 **G. “The Voyager Software Program in Its Entirety” Cannot Be**
10 **a Trade Secret.**

11 In order to constitute a trade secret, the claimed information must (1) derive
12 independent economic value from not being generally known to the public or to
13 other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (2) be
14 the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
15 secrecy. Cal. Civ. Code. § 3426.1(d). Claiming an entire software platform as
16 trade secret fails on both counts. *IDX Sys. Corp. v. Epic Sys. Corp.*, 285 F.3d 581,
17 584 (7th Cir. 2002). Designating an entire software package as a trade secret is
18 improper because it simply “invite[s] the court to hunt through the details in search
19 of items meeting the statutory definition” of a trade secret and involves “self-
20 revealing” information and “readily observable material.” *Id.* Similarly, running a
21 computer program cannot constitute misappropriation of a trade secret because
22 “[t]o the extent the mere use of a program does disclose ‘how it works,’ the
23 program is in no sense ‘secret’ and therefore fails the most basic test for protection
24 under CUTSA.” *Silvaco*, 184 Cal. App. 4th at 229; *see also Lilith Games*
25 *(Shanghai) Co. v. uCool, Inc.*, 2015 WL 4149066 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 9, 2015)
26 (plaintiff’s description of trade secrets “would have been inadequate if it had simply
27 declared that [its software program] contained valuable trade secrets”).

28 Here, Yardi claims that “the Voyager software program in its entirety” is a

